deterrence

What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for deterrence? For concreteness, for now, I’ll assume we’re discussing nuclear MAD-style deterrence, and then try to generalize later. This is like a very initial working hypothesis, without any background.

• These seem necessary and sufficient to me for MAD:
  • multiple actors have the capability to cause invaluable / irreparable damage to each other
  • second-strike ability
• What about more generally?
  • I want to write it mathematically as: deterrence is achieved if: value(action | no second order effects) >> 0 AND value(action | second order effects) < 0 AND this is common knowledge, where value is the “value function” of the actor who could take the action action, for a decently sized set of actions.
• I feel like I’m missing a bunch, but could also imagine (maybe ~10% probability) that this is actually just a really good crisp set of definitions that works.
• What am I likely missing? Very likely missing real-world caveats, and in the theoretical version, maybe “common knowledge” isn’t the right word, given that deterrence held even before the Soviets devised game theory.

Ambiguity in the escalation ladder is useful sometimes, to deter others from climbing right up to the red line.

• I mean alternatively here, you should be lowering the red line bar, right?
• Or there’s something where you want to make a clear red line up there, but also a gradient a bit down.

In other situations, it seems like what we want is in fact clear red lines.

List of books to read / skim / understand:

• Deterrence and Defense by Glenn H. Snyder (1961)
  • Purpose and Framework: Snyder’s Deterrence and Defense (1961) aims to fill the gap in systematic criteria for national security decisions by clarifying the values of deterrence and defense, their interrelation, and how to combine them efficiently into a coherent theoretical framework.
  • Deterrence vs. Defense (Ch. 1): Defines defense value as the adverse consequences an enemy move inflicts (beyond mere denial capability) and treats deterrence as part of defense; analyzes threats, commitments, bargaining, and the role of credibility (e.g., “hostaging honor” to bolster threat credibility).
  • Strategic Nuclear Power (Ch. 2): Distinguishes minimum deterrence (enough to retaliate against key city targets) from broader defense or war-winning capabilities (counterforce and economic targets), emphasizing how force requirements vary with strategic objectives.
  • NATO Strategy (Ch. 3): Explores limited‐war defense in Europe, the psychological and symbolic dimensions of aggression, the need for credible massive-retaliation threats alongside conventional forces, and European motivations for independent nuclear capabilities.
  • The “Grey Areas” (Ch. 4): Introduces limited retaliation as a bargaining strategy between all‐out nuclear war and conventional conflict, highlighting the importance of clearly understood intents, settlement focal points, and the interplay of conventional defense and nuclear blackmail.
  • Declaratory Policy (Ch. 5): Examines how states communicate intentions—through public speeches, treaties, or private notes—balancing clarity (which strengthens credibility) against ambiguity (which preserves flexibility), and the trade‐offs in specificity, publicity, and context.
  • Reconciliation of Values (Ch. 6): Contrasts the “requirements” and “limited economy” approaches, argues for simultaneous goal‐and‐force planning, and stresses minimizing expected costs plus preparedness costs while accounting for political side‐effects to achieve optimal balance among deterrence, defense, and peacetime sacrifices.

• Arms and Influence by Thomas C. Schelling (1966)

• On Escalation by Herman Kahn (1965)
• The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution by Robert Jervis (1989)
• Deterrence by Lawrence Freedman (2004)
• Deterrence Now by Patrick M. Morgan (2003)
• Maybe:
  • The Strategy of Conflict by Thomas C. Schelling (1960)
  • Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy by Todd S. Sechser & Matthew Fuhrmann (2017)